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Abstract—This paper considers a class of reinforcement-based
learning (namely, perturbed learning automata) and provides a
stochastic-stability analysis in repeatedly-played, positive-utility,
finite strategic-form games. Prior work in this class of learning
dynamics primarily analyzes asymptotic convergence through
stochastic approximations, where convergence can be associ-
ated with the limit points of an ordinary-differential equation
(ODE). However, analyzing global convergence through an ODE-
approximation requires the existence of a Lyapunov or a potential
function, which naturally restricts the analysis to a fine class
of games. To overcome these limitations, this paper introduces
an alternative framework for analyzing asymptotic convergence
that is based upon an explicit characterization of the invariant
probability measure of the induced Markov chain. We further
provide a methodology for computing the invariant probability
measure in positive-utility games, together with an illustration in
the context of coordination games.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, multi-agent formulations have been utilized to
tackle distributed optimization problems, since communication
and computational complexity might be an issue under cen-
tralized schemes. In such formulations, decisions are usually
taken in a repeated fashion, where agents select their next
actions based on their own prior experience. In the case of
finite number of actions for each agent, such multi-agent
interactions can be designed as strategic-form games, where
agents are repeatedly involved in a strategic interaction with
a fixed payoff or utility function. Such framework finds
numerous applications, including, for example, the problem
of distributed overlay routing [2], distributed topology control
[3] and distributed resource allocation [4].
Given the repeated fashion of the involved strategic in-
teractions in such formulations, several questions naturally
emerge, including: a) Can agents “learn” to asymptotically
select optimal actions?, b) What information should agents
share with each other?, and c) What is the computational
complexity of the learning process? Under the scope of en-
gineering applications, it is usually desirable that each agent
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shares minimum amount of information with other agents,
while the computational complexity of the learning process is
small. Naturally, payoff-based learning has drawn significant
attention. Under such class of learning dynamics, each agent
receives only measurements of its own utility function, while
the details of this function (i.e., its mathematical formula) are
unknown. Furthermore, each agent cannot access the actions
selected or utilities received by other agents.
In such repeatedly-played strategic-form games, a popular
objective for payoff-based learning is to guarantee convergence
(in some sense) to Nash equilibria. Convergence to Nash
equilibria may be desirable, especially when the set of optimal
centralized solutions belongs to the set of Nash equilibria.
Reinforcement-based learning has been utilized in strategic-
form games in order for agents to gradually learn to play Nash
equilibria. It may appear under alternative forms, including
discrete-time replicator dynamics [5], learning automata [6],
[7] and Q-learning [8]. In all these classes of learning dy-
namics, deriving conditions under which convergence to Nash
equilibria is achieved may not be a trivial task especially in
the case of large number of agents (as it will be discussed in
detail in the forthcoming Section II).
In the present paper, we consider a class of reinforcement-
based learning introduced in [9] that is closely related to both
discrete-time replicator dynamics and learning automata. We
will refer to this class of dynamics as perturbed learning
automata. The main difference with prior reinforcement-based
learning schemes lies in a) the step-size sequence, and b) the
perturbation (or mutations) term. The step-size sequence is
assumed constant, thus introducing a fading-memory effect
of past experiences in each agent’s strategy. On the other
hand, the perturbation term introduces errors in the selection
process of each agent. Both these two features can be used
for designing a desirable asymptotic behavior.
We provide an analytical framework for deriving conclu-
sions over the asymptotic behavior of the dynamics that is
based upon an explicit characterization of the invariant prob-
ability measure of the induced Markov chain. In particular,
we show that in all finite strategic-form games satisfying
the Positive-Utility Property (i.e., games with strictly positive
utilities), the support of the invariant probability measure
coincides with the set of pure strategy profiles. Furthermore,
we provide a methodology for computing the set of stochas-
tically stable states in all positive-utility games. We illustrate
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2this methodology in the context of coordination games and
provide a simulation study in distributed network formation.
This illustration is also of independent interest since it extends
prior work in coordination games under reinforcement-based
learning, where convergence to mixed strategy profiles may
only be excluded under strong conditions in the utility function
(e.g., existence of a potential function).
In the remainder of the paper, Section II presents the
investigated class of learning dynamics, related work and the
main contributions. Section III provides a simplification in
the characterization of stochastic stability, while Section IV
presents its technical derivation. This result is utilized for
computing the stochastically stable states in positive-utility
games in Section V. In Section VI, we present an illustration
of the proposed methodology in the context of coordination
games, together with a simulation study in distributed network
formation. Finally, Section VII presents concluding remarks.
Notation:
− For a Euclidean topological space Z ⊂ Rn, let Nδ(x)
denote the δ-neighborhood of x ∈ Z , i.e., Nδ(x) .=
{y ∈ Z : |x− y| < δ}, where | · | denotes the Euclidean
distance.
− ej denotes the unit vector in Rn where its jth entry is
equal to 1 and all other entries are equal to 0.
− ∆(n) denotes the probability simplex of dimension n,
i.e., ∆(n) .=
{
x ∈ Rn : x ≥ 0,1Tx = 1} .
− For some set A in a topological space Z , let IA : Z →
{0, 1} denote the index function, i.e.,
IA(x)
.
=
{
1 if x ∈ A,
0 else.
− For a finite set A, |A| denotes its cardinality.
− For a finite set A and any probability distribution σ ∈
∆(|A|), the random selection of an element of A will
be denoted by randσ[A]. If σ = (1/|A|, ..., 1/|A|), the
random selection will be denoted by randunif [A].
− δx denotes the Dirac measure at x.
− log(·) denotes the natural logarithm.
II. PERTURBED LEARNING AUTOMATA
A. Terminology
We consider the standard setup of finite strategic-form
games. Consider a finite set of agents (or players) I =
{1, ..., n}, and let each agent i have a finite set of actions
Ai. Let αi ∈ Ai denote any such action of agent i. The set of
action profiles is the Cartesian product A .= A1 × · · · × An
and let α = (α1, ..., αn) be a representative element of this
set. We will denote −i to be the complementary set I\i and
often decompose an action profile as follows α = (αi, α−i).
The payoff/utility function of agent i is a mapping ui(·) :
A → R. A finite strategic-form game is defined by the triple
〈I,A, {ui(·)}i〉.
TABLE I
PERTURBED LEARNING AUTOMATA
At fixed time instances t = 1, 2, ..., and for each agent i ∈ I, the
following steps are executed recursively. Let αi(t) and xi(t) denote
the current action and strategy of agent i, respectively.
1) (action update) Agent i selects a new action αi(t + 1) as
follows:
αi(t+1) =
{
randxi(t)[Ai], with probability 1− λ,
randunif [Ai], with probability λ,
(1)
for some small perturbation factor λ > 0.
2) (evaluation) Agent i applies its new action αi(t + 1) and
receives a measurement of its utility ui(α(t+ 1)) > 0.
3) (strategy update) Agent i revises its strategy xi ∈ ∆(|Ai|)
as follows:
xi(t+ 1)
= xi(t) +  · ui(α(t+ 1)) · [eαi(t+1) − xi(t)].
= Ri(α(t+ 1), xi(t)), (2)
for some constant step-size  > 0.
For the remainder of the paper, we will be concerned
with finite strategic-form games that satisfy the Positive-Utility
Property.
Property 2.1 (Positive-Utility Property): For any agent i ∈ I
and any action profile α ∈ A, ui(α) > 0.
This property is rather generic and applies to a large
family of games. For example, games at which some form of
alignment of interests exists between agents (e.g., coordination
games [10] or weakly-acyclic games [11]), can be designed
to satisfy this property, since agents’ utilities/preferences are
rather close to each other at any given action profile. However,
in the forthcoming analysis, we do not impose any structural
constraint but Property 2.1.
B. Perturbed Learning Automata
We consider a form of reinforcement-based learning that
belongs to the general class of learning automata [7]. In
learning automata, each agent updates a finite probability
distribution xi ∈ Xi .= ∆(|Ai|) representing its beliefs about
the most profitable action.
The proposed learning model is described in Table I. At
the first step, each agent i updates its action given its current
strategy vector xi(t). Its selection is slightly perturbed by a
perturbation (or mutations) factor λ > 0, such that, with a
small probability λ agent i follows a uniform strategy (or,
it trembles). At the second step, agent i evaluates its new
selection by collecting a utility measurement, while in the last
step, agent i updates its strategy vector.
Here, we identify actions Ai with vertices of the simplex,
{e1, ..., e|Ai|}. For example, if agent i selects its jth action
at time t, then eαi(t) ≡ ej . To better see how the strategies
evolve, let us consider the following toy example. Let the
current strategy of agent i be xi(t) =
(
1/2 1/2
)T
, i.e.,
3agent i has two actions, each assigned probability 1/2. Let also
αi(t+ 1) = 1, i.e., agent i selects the first action according to
rule (1). Then, the new strategy vector for agent i is:
xi(t+ 1) = 1/2
(
1 + ui(α(t+ 1))
1− ui(α(t+ 1))
)
.
Note that the strategy of the selected action increased by
an amount that is proportional to the reward received. In
other words, the dynamics reinforce repeated selection, and
the reinforcement size, ui(α(t+ 1)), depends on the reward
received.
By playing a strategic-form game repeatedly over time,
players do not always experience the same reward when
selecting the same action, since other players may also change
their actions. This dynamic element of the reinforcement size
is the factor that complicates its convergence analysis, as it
will become clear in the forthcoming Section II-C.
Note that by letting the step-size  to be sufficiently small
and since the utility function ui(·) is uniformly bounded in A,
xi(t) ∈ ∆(|Ai|) for all t.
In case λ = 0, the above update recursion will be referred
to as the unperturbed learning automata.
C. Related work
In this section, we provide a short overview of alterna-
tive payoff-based learning schemes specifically designed for
repeatedly-played strategic-form games with a finite set of
actions and a fixed utility function for each player. We have
identified four main classes of payoff-based dynamics under
such structural assumptions, namely discrete-time replicator
dynamics, learning automata, Q-learning, and aspiration-
based learning. Note that payoff-based learning has also been
applied to static games with continuous action sets, e.g.,
extremum-seeking control [12], [13] or actor-critic reinforce-
ment learning [14]. The focus here instead is only on finite
action sets.
Discrete-time replicator dynamics: A type of learning dy-
namics which is quite closely related to the dynamics of
Table I is the discrete-time version of replicator dynamics
(cf., [15]). There have been several variations with respect to
the selection of the step-size sequence. For example, Arthur
[5] considered a similar rule, with λ = 0 and step-size
i(t) = 1/(ct
ν + ui(α(t + 1)), for some positive constant
c and for ν ∈ (0, 1) (in the place of the constant step-size  of
(2)). A comparative model is also used by Hopkins and Posch
in [16], with i(t) = 1/(Vi(t) + ui(α(t+ 1))), where Vi(t) is
the accumulated benefits of agent i up to time t, which gives
rise to the urn process of Erev-Roth [17]. Some similarities
are also shared with the Cross’ learning model of [18], where
i(t) = 1 and ui(α(t)) ≤ 1, and its modification presented by
Leslie in [19], where (t), instead, is decreasing with time.
The main difference of the proposed dynamics of Table I lies
in the perturbation parameter λ > 0 which was first introduced
and analyzed in [9]. A state-dependent perturbation term has
also been investigated in [20]. The perturbation parameter
may serve as an equilibrium selection mechanism, since it
may exclude convergence to action profiles that are not Nash
equilibria (briefly, non-Nash action profiles) [9]. It resolved
one of the main issues of discrete-time replicator dynamics,
that is the positive probability of convergence to non-Nash
action profiles.
Although excluding convergence to non-Nash action profiles
can be guaranteed by sufficiently small λ > 0, establishing
convergence to action profiles that are Nash equilibria (pure
Nash equilibria) may still be an issue. This is desirable in
the context of coordination games [21], where Pareto-efficient
outcomes are usually pure Nash equilibria (see, e.g., the
definition of a coordination game in [10]). As shown in [20],
convergence to pure Nash equilibria can be guaranteed only
under strong conditions in the utility function. For example,
as shown in [20, Proposition 8], and under the ODE-method
for stochastic approximations, it requires a) the existence
of a potential function, and b) conditions over the Jacobian
matrix of the potential function. Even if a potential function
does exist, verifying conditions (b) is practically infeasible for
games of more than 2 players [20].
On the other hand, an important side-benefit of using this
class of dynamics is the indirect “filtering” of the utility-
function measurements (through the formulation of the strat-
egy vectors in (2)). This is demonstrated, for example, in
[16] for the Erev-Roth model [17], where the robustness of
convergence/non-convergence asymptotic results is presented
under the presence of noise in the utility measurements.
Learning automata: Learning automata, as first introduced
by [6], have been used to the control of complex systems due
to their simple structure and low computational complexity
(cf., [7, Chapter 1]). Variable-structure stochastic automata
may incorporate a form of reinforcement of favorable actions,
similarly to the replicator dynamics discussed above. An
example is the linear reward-inaction scheme [7, Chapter 4].
Comparing it with the reinforcement rule of (2), the linear
reward-inaction scheme accepts a utility of the form ui(α) ∈
{0, 1}, where 0 corresponds to an unfavorable response and
1 corresponds to a favorable one. More general forms can
also be used when the utility function may accept discrete or
continuous values in the unit interval [0, 1].
Analysis of learning automata in games has been restricted
to zero-sum and identical-interest games [7], [22]. In identical
interest games, convergence analysis has been derived for
small number of players and actions, due to the difficulty in
deriving conditions for absolute monotonicity, which corre-
sponds to the property that the expected utility received by
each player increases monotonically in time (cf., [7, Defini-
tion 8.1]). Similar are the results presented in [22].
The property of absolute monotonicity is closely related to
the existence of a potential function, as in the case of potential
4games [23]. Similarly to the discrete-time replicator dynamics,
convergence to non-Nash action profiles cannot be excluded
when the step-size sequence is constant, even if the utility
function satisfies ui(α) ∈ [0, 1]. (The behavior under decreas-
ing step-size is different as [20, Proposition 2] has shown.)
Furthermore, deriving conditions for excluding convergence
to mixed strategy profiles in coordination games continues to
be an issue, as in discrete-time replicator dynamics.
Recognizing these issues, reference [24] introduced a class
of linear reward-inaction schemes in combination with a coor-
dinated exploration phase so that convergence to the efficient
(pure) Nash equilibrium is achieved. However, coordination
of the exploration phase requires communication between the
players, an approach that does not fit to the distributed nature
of dynamics pursued here.
Q-learning: Similar questions of convergence to Nash equi-
libria also appear in alternative reinforcement-based learning
formulations, such as approximate dynamic programming and
Q-learning. Usually, under Q-learning, players keep track of
the discounted running average reward received by each action,
based on which optimal decisions are made (see, e.g., [25]).
Convergence to Nash equilibria can be accomplished under a
stronger set of assumptions, which increases the computational
complexity of the dynamics. For example, in the Nash-Q
learning algorithm of [8], it is indirectly assumed that agents
need to have full access to the joint action space and the
rewards received by other agents.
More recently, reference [26] introduced a Q-learning
scheme in combination with either adaptive play or better-
reply dynamics in order to attain convergence to Nash equilib-
ria in potential games [23] or weakly-acyclic games. However,
this form of dynamics requires that each player observes the
actions selected by the other players, since a Q-value needs
to be assigned to each joint action.
When the evaluation of the Q-values is totally independent,
as in the individual Q-learning in [25], then convergence to
Nash equilibria has been shown only for 2-player zero-sum
games and 2-player partnership games with countably many
Nash equilibria. Currently, there exist no convergence results
in multi-player games. To overcome this deficiency of Q-
learning, in the context of stochastic dynamic games, reference
[27] employs an additional feature (motivated by [11]), namely
exploration phases. In any such exploration phase, all agents
use constant policies, something that allows for an accurate
computation of the optimal Q-factors. We may argue that
the introduction of common exploration phases for all agents
partially destroys the distributed nature of the dynamics, since
it requires synchronization between agents.
Aspiration-based learning: Recently, there have been sev-
eral attempts to establish convergence to Nash equilibria
through alternative payoff-based learning dynamics, e.g., the
benchmark-based dynamics of [11] for convergence to Nash
equilibria in weakly-acyclic games, the trial-and-error learn-
ing [28] for convergence to Nash equilibria in generic games,
the mood-based dynamics of [29] for maximizing welfare
in generic games and the aspiration learning in [10] for
convergence to efficient outcomes in coordination games. We
will refer to such approaches as aspiration-based learning.
For these types of dynamics, convergence to Nash equilibria
or efficient outcomes can be established without requiring any
strong monotonicity properties (as in the multi-player weakly-
acyclic games in [11]).
The case of noisy utility measurements, which are present
in many engineering applications, has not currently been ad-
dressed through aspiration-based learning. The only exception
is reference [11], under benchmark-based dynamics, where
(synchronized) exploration phases are introduced through
which each agent plays a fixed action for the duration of
the exploration phase. If such exploration phases are large
in duration (as required by the results in [11]), this may
reduce the robustness of the dynamics to dynamic changes
in the environment (e.g., changes in the utility function).
One reason that such robustness analysis is currently not
possible in this class of dynamics is the fact that decisions
are taken directly based on the measured performances (e.g.,
by comparing the currently measured performance with the
benchmark performance in [11]).
D. Contributions
The aforementioned literature in payoff-based learning dy-
namics in finite strategic-form games can be grouped into two
main categories, namely reinforcement-based learning (includ-
ing discrete-time replicator dynamics, learning automata and
Q-learning) and aspiration-based learning. Summarizing their
main advantages/disadvantages, we may argue the following
high-level observations.
(O1) Strong asymptotic convergence guarantees for large
number of players, even for generic games, are currently
possible under aspiration-based learning. Similar results
in reinforcement-based learning are currently restricted
to games of small number of players and under strong
structural assumptions (e.g., the existence of a potential
function). See, for example, the discussion on discrete-
time replicator dynamics or learning automata in [20],
or the discussion on Q-learning in [27].
(O2) Noisy observations can be “handled” through
reinforcement-based learning due to the indirect
filtering of the observation signals (e.g., through the
formulation of the strategy-vector in the dynamics of
Table I or through the formulation of the Q factors
in Q-learning). This is demonstrated, for example, in
the convergence/non-convergence asymptotic results
presented in [16] for a variation of the proposed learning
dynamics of Table I (with λ = 0 and decreasing )
and under the presence of noise. Similar effects in
5aspiration-based learning can currently be achieved only
through the introduction of synchronized exploration
phases, as discussed in Section II-C.
Motivated by these two observations (O1)–(O2), and the
obvious inability of reinforcement-based learning to provide
strong asymptotic convergence guarantees in large games, this
paper advances the asymptotic convergence guarantees for a
class of reinforcement-based learning described in Table I. Our
goal is to go beyond common restrictions of small number of
players and strong assumptions in the game structure (such as
the existence of a potential function).
The proposed dynamics (also perturbed learning automata)
were first introduced in [9] to resolve stability issues in the
boundary of the domain appearing in prior schemes [5], [16].
This was achieved through the introduction of the perturbation
factor λ of Table I. However, strong convergence guarantees
(e.g., w.p.1 convergence to Nash equilibria or efficient out-
comes) is currently limited to small number of players and
under strict structural assumptions, e.g., the existence of a
potential function and conditions on its Jacobian matrix [20].
In this paper, we drop the assumption of a decreasing step-
size sequence, and instead we consider the case of a constant
step-size  > 0. Such selection increases the adaptivity of the
dynamics to varying conditions (e.g., the number of agents
or the utility function). Furthermore, we provide a stochastic-
stability analysis that provides a detailed characterization of
the invariant probability measure of the induced Markov chain.
In particular, our contributions are as follows:
(C1) We provide an equivalent finite-dimensional charac-
terization of the infinite-dimensional induced Markov
chain of the dynamics, that simplifies significantly the
computation of its invariant probability measure. This
simplification is based upon a weak-convergence result
and it applies to any finite strategic-form game with the
Positive-Utility Property 2.1 (Theorem 3.1).
(C2) We capitalize on this simplification and provide a
methodology for computing stochastically stable states
in positive-utility finite strategic-form games (Theo-
rem 5.1).
(C3) We illustrate the utility of this methodology in establish-
ing stochastic stability in a class of coordination games
with no restriction on the number of players or actions
(Theorem 6.1).
These contributions significantly extend the utility of
reinforcement-based learning given observation (O1). Note
that (C2) does not impose any structural assumptions other
than the positive-utility property. Furthermore, (C3) is of
independent interest. To the best of our knowledge, (C3) is the
first convergence result in the context of reinforcement-based
learning in repeatedly-played finite strategic-form games with
the following features: a) a completely distributed setup (i.e.,
without any information exchange between players), b) more
than two players, and c) a weakly-acyclicity condition that
does not require the existence of a potential function.
The derived convergence results may not be as strong as
the ones currently derived under aspiration-based learning,
as discussed in Section II-C. However, reinforcement-based
learning may better incorporate noisy observations (as dis-
cussed in observation (O2)). Moreover, additional features may
allow for stronger convergence guarantees, even to Pareto-
efficient outcomes, as presented in [9]. Given the simplified
analytical framework presented here, the prospects of even
stronger convergence guarantees are promising.
This paper is an extension over an earlier version appeared
in [1], which only focused on contribution (C1) above.
III. STOCHASTIC STABILITY
In this section, we provide a characterization of the invariant
probability measure µλ of the induced Markov chain Pλ of
the dynamics of Table I. The importance lies in an equivalence
relation (established through a weak-convergence argument) of
µλ with an invariant distribution of a finite-state Markov chain.
Characterization of the stochastic stability of the dynamics
will follow directly due to the Birkhoff’s individual ergodic
theorem. This simplification in the characterization of µλ will
be the first important step for providing specialized results for
stochastic stability in strategic-form games.
A. Terminology and notation
Let Z .= A × X , where X .= X1 × . . . × Xn, i.e., pairs
of joint actions α and strategy profiles x. We will denote the
elements of the state space Z by z.
The set A is endowed with the discrete topology, X with
its usual Euclidean topology, and Z with the corresponding
product topology. We also let B(Z) denote the Borel σ-field
of Z , and P(Z) the set of probability measures (p.m.) on
B(Z) endowed with the Prohorov topology, i.e., the topology
of weak convergence. The learning algorithm of Table I defines
an Z-valued Markov chain. Let Pλ : Z × B(Z) → [0, 1]
denote its transition probability function (t.p.f.), parameterized
by λ > 0. We refer to the process with λ > 0 as the perturbed
process. Let also P : Z ×B(Z) → [0, 1] denote the t.p.f. of
the unperturbed process, i.e., when λ = 0. We also define the
t-step t.p.f. P t : Z ×B(Z)→ [0, 1] recursively as:
P t(z,D) =
∫
Z
P (z, dy)P t−1(y,D).
We let Cb(Z) denote the Banach space of real-valued
continuous functions on Z under the sup-norm (denoted by
‖ · ‖∞) topology. For f ∈ Cb(Z), define
Pλf(z)
.
=
∫
Z
Pλ(z, dy)f(y),
and
µ[f ]
.
=
∫
Z
µ(dz)f(z), for µ ∈ P(Z).
6The unperturbed process governed by the t.p.f. P will be
denoted by Z .= {Zt : t ≥ 0}. Let Ω .= Z∞ denote the
canonical path space, i.e., an element ω ∈ Ω is a sequence
{ω(0), ω(1), . . . }, with ω(t) = (α(t), x(t)) ∈ Z . We use the
same notation for the elements (α, x) of the space Z and for
the coordinates of the process Zt = (α(t), x(t)). Let also Pz[·]
denote the unique p.m. induced by the unperturbed process
P on the product σ-field of Z∞, initialized at z = (α, x),
and Ez[·] the corresponding expectation operator. Let also θ :
Ω → Ω denote the shift operator, such that (Z ◦ θt)(ω) .=
Z(θt(ω)) = {Zt, Zt+1, ...}. Furthermore, for D ∈ B(Z), let
τ(D) be the first hitting time of the unperturbed process to D,
i.e., τ(D) .= inf{t ≥ 0 : Zt ∈ D}.
B. Stochastic stability
First, we note that both P and Pλ (λ > 0) satisfy the weak
Feller property (cf., [30, Definition 4.4.2]).
Proposition 3.1: Both the unperturbed process P (λ = 0)
and the perturbed process Pλ (λ > 0) have the weak Feller
property.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The measure µλ ∈ P(Z) is called an invariant probability
measure (i.p.m.) for Pλ if
(µλPλ)(A)
.
=
∫
Z
µλ(dz)Pλ(z,A) = µλ(A), A ∈ B(Z).
Since Z defines a locally compact separable metric space and
P , Pλ have the weak Feller property, they both admit an i.p.m.,
denoted µ and µλ, respectively [30, Theorem 7.2.3].
We would like to characterize the stochastically stable states
z ∈ Z of Pλ, that is any state z ∈ Z for which any collection
of i.p.m.’s {µλ ∈ P(Z) : µλPλ = µλ, λ > 0} satisfies
lim infλ→0 µλ(z) > 0. As the forthcoming analysis will show,
the stochastically stable states will be a subset of the set of
pure strategy states (p.s.s.) defined as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Pure Strategy State): A pure strategy state is
a state s = (α, x) ∈ Z such that for all i ∈ I, xi = eαi , i.e.,
xi coincides with the vertex of the probability simplex ∆(|Ai|)
which assigns probability 1 to action αi.
We will denote the set of pure strategy states by S.
Theorem 3.1 (Stochastic Stability): There exists a unique
probability vector pi = (pi1, ..., pi|S|) such that for any col-
lection of i.p.m.’s {µλ ∈ P(Z) : µλPλ = µλ, λ > 0}, the
following hold:
(a) limλ→0 µλ(·) = µˆ(·) .=
∑
s∈S pisδs(·), where conver-
gence is in the weak sense.
(b) The probability vector pi is an invariant distribution of
the (finite-state) Markov process Pˆ , such that, for any
s, s′ ∈ S,
Pˆss′
.
= lim
t→∞QP
t(s,Nδ(s′)), (3)
for some δ > 0 sufficiently small, where Q is the
t.p.f. corresponding to only one agent trembling (i.e.,
following the uniform distribution of (1)).
The proof of Theorem 3.1 requires a series of propositions
and it will be presented in detail in Section IV.
Theorem 3.1 implicitly provides a stochastically stability
argument. In fact, the expected asymptotic behavior of the
dynamics can be characterized by µˆ and, therefore, pi. In
particular, by Birkhoff’s individual ergodic theorem [30, The-
orem 2.3.4], the weak convergence of µλ to µˆ, and the fact
that µλ is ergodic, we have that the expected percentage
of time that the process spends in any O ∈ B(Z) such
that ∂O ∩ S 6= ∅ is given by µˆ(O) as the experimentation
probability λ approaches zero and time increases, i.e.,
lim
λ↓0
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
P kλ (x,O)
)
= µˆ(O) .
C. Discussion
Theorem 3.1 establishes “equivalence” (in a weak conver-
gence sense) of the original (perturbed) learning process with
a simplified process, where only one agent trembles at the
first iteration and then no agent trembles thereafter. This
simplification in the analysis has originally been capitalized
to analyze aspiration learning dynamics in [31], [10], and
it is based upon the observation that under the unperturbed
process, agents’ strategies will converge to a pure strategy
state, as it will be shown in the forthcoming Section IV.
The limiting behavior of the original (perturbed) dynamics
is characterized by the (unique) invariant distribution of the
finite-state Markov chain {Pss′}, whose states correspond to
the pure strategy states S . In other words, we should expect
that as the perturbation parameter λ approaches zero, the
algorithm spends the majority of the time on pure strategy
states. The importance of this result lies on the fact that no
constraints have been imposed in the payoff matrix/function
of the game other than the Positive-Utility Property 2.1.
In the forthcoming Section V, we will use this result to
provide a methodology for computing the set of stochastically
stable states. Then, in Section VI, this methodology will be
illustrated in the context of coordination games.
IV. TECHNICAL DERIVATION
In this section, we provide the main steps for the proof of
Theorem 3.1. We begin by investigating the asymptotic behav-
ior of the unperturbed process P , and then we characterize the
i.p.m. of the perturbed process with respect to the p.s.s.’s S.
A. Unperturbed Process
For t ≥ 0 define the sets
At
.
= {ω ∈ Ω : α(τ) = α(t) , for all τ ≥ t} ,
Bt
.
= {ω ∈ Ω : α(τ) = α(0) , for all 0 ≤ τ ≤ t} .
7Note that {Bt : t ≥ 0} is a non-increasing sequence, i.e.,
Bt+1 ⊆ Bt, while {At : t ≥ 0} is non-decreasing, i.e.,
At+1 ⊇ At. Let A∞ .=
⋃∞
t=0At and B∞
.
=
⋂∞
t=1Bt. In other
words, A∞ corresponds to the event that agents eventually
play the same action profile, while B∞ corresponds to the
event that agents never change their actions. The following
proposition discusses convergence of the unperturbed process
to the set of p.s.s.’s, S.
Proposition 4.1 (Convergence to p.s.s.): Let us assume that
the step-size  > 0 is sufficiently small such that 0 < ui(α) <
1 for all α ∈ A and i ∈ I. Then, the following hold:
(a) infz∈Z Pz[B∞] > 0,
(b) infz∈Z Pz[A∞] = 1.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
Statement (a) of Proposition 4.1 states that the probability
that agents never change their actions is bounded away
from zero, while statement (b) states that the probability that
eventually agents play the same action profile is one. This
also indicates that any invariant measure of the unperturbed
process can be characterized with respect to the pure strategy
states S, which is established by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (Limiting t.p.f. of unperturbed process): Let
µ denote an i.p.m. of P . Then, there exists a t.p.f. Π on Z ×
B(Z) with the following properties:
(a) for µ-a.e. z ∈ Z , Π(z, ·) is an i.p.m. for P ;
(b) for all f ∈ Cb(Z), limt→∞ ‖P tf −Πf‖∞ = 0;
(c) µ is an i.p.m. for Π;
(d) the support1 of Π is on S for all z ∈ Z .
Proof. The state space Z is a locally compact separable metric
space and the t.p.f. of the unperturbed process P admits an
i.p.m. due to Proposition 3.1. Thus, statements (a), (b) and (c)
follow directly from [30, Theorem 5.2.2 (a), (b), (e)].
(d) Let us assume that the support of Π includes points in Z
other than the pure strategy states in S. Then, there exists an
open set O ∈ B(Z) such that O ∩ S = ∅ and Π(z∗, O) > 0
for some z∗ ∈ Z . According to (b), P t converges weakly to Π.
Thus, from Portmanteau theorem (cf., [30, Theorem 1.4.16]),
we have that lim inft→∞ P t(z∗, O) ≥ Π(z∗, O) > 0. This
is a contradiction of Proposition 4.1(b), which concludes the
proof. 
Proposition 4.2 states that the limiting unperturbed t.p.f.
converges weakly to a t.p.f. Π which accepts the same i.p.m.
as P . Furthermore, the support of Π is the set of pure strategy
states S. This is a rather important observation, since the
limiting perturbed process can also be “related” (in a weak-
convergence sense) to the t.p.f. Π, as it will be shown in the
following section.
1The support of a measure µ on Z is the unique closed set F ⊂ B(Z)
such that µ(Z\F ) = 0 and µ(F ∩O) > 0 for every open set O ⊂ Z such
that F ∩O 6= ∅.
B. Perturbed process
According to the definition of perturbed learning automata
of Table I, when an agent updates its action, there is a small
probability λ > 0 that it “trembles,” i.e., it selects a new action
according to a uniform distribution. Thus, we can decompose
the t.p.f. induced by the one-step update as follows:
Pλ = (1− ϕ(λ))P + ϕ(λ)Qλ
where ϕ(λ) = 1− (1−λ)n is the probability that at least one
agent trembles (since (1−λ)n is the probability that no agent
trembles), and Qλ corresponds to the t.p.f. when at least one
agent trembles. Note that ϕ(λ)→ 0 as λ ↓ 0.
Define also Q as the t.p.f. where only one agent trembles,
and Q∗ as the t.p.f. where at least two agents tremble. Then,
we may write:
Qλ = (1− ψ(λ))Q+ ψ(λ)Q∗, (4)
where ψ(λ) .= 1− nλ(1−λ)n−11−(1−λ)n corresponds to the probability
that at least two agents tremble given that at least one agent
trembles. It also satisfies ψ(λ)→ 0 as λ ↓ 0, which establishes
an approximation of Qλ by Q as the perturbation factor λ
approaches zero.
Let us also define the infinite-step t.p.f. when trembling only
at the first step (briefly, lifted t.p.f.) as follows:
PLλ
.
= ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))tQλP t = QλRλ (5)
where Rλ
.
= ϕ(λ)
∑∞
t=0(1 − ϕ(λ))tP t, i.e., Rλ corresponds
to the resolvent t.p.f.
In the following proposition, we establish weak-convergence
of the lifted t.p.f. PLλ to QΠ as λ ↓ 0, which will further allow
for an explicit characterization of the weak limit points of the
i.p.m. of Pλ.
Proposition 4.3 (i.p.m. of perturbed process): The following
hold:
(a) For f ∈ Cb(Z), limλ→0 ‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ = 0.
(b) For f ∈ Cb(Z), limλ→0 ‖PLλ f −QΠf‖∞ = 0.
(c) Any i.p.m. µλ of Pλ is also an i.p.m. of PLλ .
(d) Any weak limit point in P(Z) of µλ, as λ → 0, is an
i.p.m. of QΠ.
Proof. (a) For any f ∈ Cb(Z), we have
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞
= ‖ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))tP tf −Πf‖∞
= ‖ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))t(P tf −Πf)‖∞,
where we have used ϕ(λ)
∑∞
t=0(1− ϕ(λ))t = 1. Note that
ϕ(λ)
∞∑
t=T
(1− ϕ(λ))t‖P tf −Πf‖∞
≤ (1− ϕ(λ))T sup
t≥T
‖P tf −Πf‖∞.
8From Proposition 4.2(b), we have that for any δ > 0, there
exists T = T (δ) > 0 such that the r.h.s. is uniformly bounded
by δ for all t ≥ T . Thus, the sequence
ΘT
.
= ϕ(λ)
T∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))t(P tf −Πf)
is Cauchy and therefore convergent (under the sup-norm). In
other words, there exists Θ ∈ R such that limT→∞ ‖ΘT −
Θ‖∞ = 0. For every T > 0, we have
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ ≤ ‖ΘT ‖∞ + ‖Θ−ΘT ‖∞.
Note that
‖ΘT ‖∞ ≤ ϕ(λ)
T∑
t=0
(1− ϕ(λ))t‖P tf −Πf‖∞.
If we take λ ↓ 0, then the r.h.s. converges to zero. Thus,
lim
λ↓0
‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ ≤ ‖Θ−ΘT ‖∞, for all T > 0,
which concludes the proof.
(b) For any f ∈ Cb(Z), we have
‖PLλ f −QΠf‖∞
≤ ‖Qλ(Rλf −Πf)‖∞ + ‖QλΠf −QΠf‖∞
≤ ‖Rλf −Πf‖∞ + ‖QλΠf −QΠf‖∞.
The first term of the r.h.s. approaches 0 as λ ↓ 0 according to
(a). The second term of the r.h.s. also approaches 0 as λ ↓ 0
since Qλ → Q as λ ↓ 0.
(c) By definition of the perturbed t.p.f. Pλ, we have
PλRλ = (1− ϕ(λ))PRλ + ϕ(λ)QλRλ.
Note that QλRλ = PLλ and (1 − ϕ(λ))PRλ = Rλ − ϕ(λ)I,
where I corresponds to the identity operator. Thus,
PλRλ = Rλ − ϕ(λ)I + ϕ(λ)PLλ .
For any i.p.m. of Pλ, µλ, we have
µλPλRλ = µλRλ − ϕ(λ)µλ + ϕ(λ)µλPLλ ,
which equivalently implies that µλ = µλPLλ , since µλPλ =
µλ. We conclude that µλ is also an i.p.m. of PLλ .
(d) Let µˆ denote a weak limit point of µλ as λ ↓ 0. To see
that such a limit exists, take µˆ to be an i.p.m. of P . Then,
‖Pλf − Pf‖∞
≥ ‖µλ(Pλf − Pf)‖∞
= ‖(µλ − µˆ)(I − P )[f ]‖∞.
Thus, the weak convergence of Pλ to P implies that µλ ⇒ µˆ.
Note further that
µˆ[f ]− µˆ[QΠf ]
= (µˆ[f ]− µλ[f ]) + µλ[PLλ f −QΠf ]+
(µλ[QΠf ]− µˆ[QΠf ]).
The first and the third term of the r.h.s. approaches 0 as
λ ↓ 0 due to the fact that µλ ⇒ µˆ. The same holds for the
second term of the r.h.s. due to part (b). Thus, we conclude
that any weak limit point of µλ as λ ↓ 0 is an i.p.m. of QΠ. 
Proposition 4.3 establishes convergence (in a weak sense)
of the i.p.m. µλ of the perturbed process to an i.p.m. of QΠ.
In the following section, this convergence result will allow for
a more explicit characterization of µλ as λ ↓ 0.
C. Equivalent finite-state Markov process
Define the finite-state Markov process Pˆ as in (3).
Proposition 4.4 (Unique i.p.m. of QΠ): There exists a
unique i.p.m. µˆ of QΠ. It satisfies
µˆ(·) =
∑
s∈S
pisδs(·) (6)
for some constants pis ≥ 0, s ∈ S. Moreover, pi =
(pi1, ..., pi|S|) is an invariant distribution of Pˆ , i.e., pi = piPˆ .
Proof. From Proposition 4.2(d), we know that the support of
Π is the set of pure strategy states S. Thus, the support of QΠ
is also on S . From Proposition 4.3, we know that QΠ admits
an i.p.m., say µˆ, whose support is also S. Thus, µˆ admits the
form of (6), for some constants pis ≥ 0, s ∈ S.
For any two distinct s, s′ ∈ S, note that Nδ(s′), δ > 0, is
a continuity set of QΠ(s, ·), i.e., QΠ(s, ∂Nδ(s′)) = 0. Thus,
from Portmanteau theorem, given that QP t ⇒ QΠ,
QΠ(s,Nδ(s′)) = lim
t→∞QP
t(s,Nδ(s′)) = Pˆss′ .
If we also define pis
.
= µˆ(Nδ(s)), then
pis′ = µˆ(Nδ(s′)) =
∑
s∈S
pisQΠ(s,Nδ(s′)) =
∑
s∈S
pisPˆss′ ,
which shows that pi is an invariant distribution of Pˆ .
It remains to establish uniqueness of the invariant
distribution of QΠ. Note that the set S of pure strategy
states is isomorphic with the set A of action profiles. If
agent i trembles (as t.p.f. Q dictates), then all actions
in Ai have positive probability of being selected, i.e.,
Q(α, (α′i, α−i)) > 0 for all α
′
i ∈ Ai and i ∈ I. It follows by
Proposition 4.1 that QΠ(α, (α′i, α−i)) > 0 for all α
′
i ∈ Ai
and i ∈ I. Finite induction then shows that (QΠ)n(α, α′) > 0
for all α, α′ ∈ A. It follows that if we restrict the domain
of QΠ to S, it defines an irreducible stochastic matrix.
Therefore, QΠ has a unique i.p.m. 
D. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Theorem 3.1(a)–(b) is a direct implication of Proposi-
tions 4.3–4.4.
V. STOCHASTICALLY STABLE STATES
In this section, we capitalize on Theorem 3.1 and we further
simplify the computation of the stochastically stable states in
strategic-form games satisfying Property 2.1.
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Fig. 1. Examples of s-graphs in case S contains four states.
A. Background on finite Markov chains
In order to compute the invariant distribution of a finite-
state, irreducible and aperiodic Markov chain, we are going to
consider a characterization introduced by [32]. In particular,
for finite Markov chains an invariant measure can be expressed
as the ratio of sums of products consisting of transition
probabilities. These products can be described conveniently by
means of graphs on the set of states of the chain. In particular,
let S be a finite set of states, whose elements will be denoted
by sk, s`, etc., and let a subset W of S.
Definition 5.1: (W-graph) A graph consisting of arrows
sk → s` (sk ∈ S\W, s` ∈ S, s` 6= sk) is called a W-graph if
it satisfies the following conditions:
1) every point k ∈ S\W is the initial point of exactly one
arrow;
2) there are no closed cycles in the graph; or, equivalently,
for any point sk ∈ S\W there exists a sequence of
arrows leading from it to some point s` ∈ W .
Fig. 1 provides examples of {s}-graphs for some state s ∈ S
when S contains four states. We will denote by G{W} the set
of W-graphs and we shall use the letter g to denote graphs. If
Pˆsks` are nonnegative numbers, where sk, s` ∈ S, define also
the transition probability along path g as
$(g)
.
=
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
Pˆsks` .
The following Lemma holds:
Lemma 5.1 (Lemma 6.3.1 in [32]): Let us consider a Markov
chain with a finite set of states S and transition probabilities
{Pˆsks`} and assume that every state can be reached from any
other state in a finite number of steps. Then, the stationary
distribution of the chain is pi = [pis], where
pis =
Rs∑
si∈S Rsi
, s ∈ S (7)
where Rs
.
=
∑
g∈G{s}$(g).
In other words, in order to compute the weight that the
stationary distribution assigns to a state s ∈ S, it suffices to
compute the ratio of the transition probabilities of all {s}-
graphs over the transition probabilities of all graphs.
B. Approximation of one-step transition probability
We wish to provide an approximation in the computation
of the transition probabilities under Pˆ , in order to explicitly
compute the stationary distribution pi of Theorem 3.1. Based
on the definition of the t.p.f. QΠ, and as λ ↓ 0, a transition
from s to s′ influences the stationary distribution only if s
differs from s′ in the action of a single agent. This observation
will be capitalized by the forthcoming Lemmas 5.2–5.3, to
approximate the transition probability from s to s′ under Pˆ .
Let us define τ∗s(D) to be the minimum number of steps
that the process QΠ needs in order to reach D when starting
from s ∈ S (i.e., the minimum possible first hitting time to
D).
Lemma 5.2 (One-step transition probability): Consider any
two action profiles α, α′ ∈ A which differ in the action of
a single agent j, and let s, s′ ∈ S be the p.s.s.’s associated
with α and α′, respectively. Set z′ = (α′, x′), where x′j
.
=
eαj + uj(α
′)(eα′j −eαj ), which corresponds to the state after
agent j perturbed once starting from s and played α′j . Define
also
P˘ss′(δ)
.
= Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ ∞]
which corresponds to the probability that the process eventu-
ally reaches Nδ(s′) starting from z′. For sufficiently small 
such that 0 < uj(α′) < 1, the following hold:
(a) The transition probability from s to s′ under QΠ can be
approximated as follows:
Pˆss′ = γj · lim
δ↓0
P˘ss′(δ), (8)
where γj
.
= 1/(n |Aj |) corresponds to the probability
that agent j trembled and selected action α′j under Q.
(b) P˘ss′(δ) coincides with the probability of the shortest
path, i.e.,
P˘ss′(δ) = Pz′ [α(t+ 1) = α′ ,∀t < τ∗s(Nδ(s′))] .
(c) There exists negative constant η(δ), such that for any
transition step s → s′ (with the above properties) and
for sufficiently small  > 0,
P˘ss′(δ) ≈ exp
(
η(δ)
uj(α′)
)
. (9)
Proof. See Appendix C. 
Note that for sufficiently small , the larger the destination
utility uj(α′), the larger the transition probability to s′, since
η(δ) < 0. In a way, the inverse of the destination utility at s′
represents a measure of “resistance” of the process to transit to
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s′. Lemma 5.2 provides a tool for simplifying the computation
of stochastically stable pure strategy states as it will become
apparent in the following section.
C. Approximation of stationary distribution
In this section, using Lemma 5.2 that approximates one-
step transition probabilities, we provide an approximation
of the i.p.m. of the t.p.f. QΠ. By definition of QΠ, this
approximation is based upon the observation that for the
computation of the quantities Rs of Lemma 5.1, it suffices
to consider only those paths in G{s} which involve one-step
transitions as defined in Lemma 5.2.
Define G(1){s} ⊆ G{s} to be the set of s-graphs consisting
solely of one-step transitions, i.e., for any g ∈ G(1){s} and
any arrow (sk → s`) ∈ g, the associated action profiles, say
α(k), α(`), respectively, differ in a single action of a single
agent. It is straightforward to check that G(1){s} 6= ∅ for any
s ∈ S.
Lemma 5.3 (Approximation of stationary distribution): The
stationary distribution of the finite Markov chain {Pˆsks`}, pi =
[pis], satisfies
pis = lim
δ↓0
R˘s(δ)∑
si∈S R˘si(δ)
, s ∈ S, (10)
where R˘s(δ)
.
=
∑
g∈G(1){s} $˘(g; δ), and
$˘(g; δ)
.
= γ¯g
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
P˘sks`(δ), (11)
for some constant γ¯g ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. According to Lemma 5.1, for any s ∈ S, we have
pis = Rs/
∑
si∈S Rsi . Given the definition of the t.p.f. Q,
where only one agent trembles, we should only consider one-
step transition probabilities (as defined in Lemma 5.2). Thus,
Rs =
∑
g∈G(1){s}
$(g) =
∑
g∈G(1){s}
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
Pˆsks` .
According to Lemma 5.2 and Equation (8), we have
Rs = lim
δ↓0
∑
g∈G(1){s}
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
γj(sk,s`)P˘sks`(δ)
= lim
δ↓0
∑
g∈G(1){s}
γ¯g
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
P˘sks`(δ)
where j(sk, s`) denotes the single agent whose action changes
from sk to s`, and γ¯g
.
=
∏
(sk→s`)∈g γj(sk,s`) ∈ (0, 1). Thus,
the conclusion follows. 
Note that Lemma 5.3 provides a simplification to Theo-
rem 3.1, since it suffices to compute the transition probabilities
of the W-graphs consisting solely of one step transitions.
Furthermore, the transition probability of any such graph,
$˘(g; δ), can be computed by Lemma 5.2, which provides
an explicit formula for one-step transitions. In the following
section, the computation of the stationary distribution will
further be simplified and related to the resistance of one-step
transitions.
D. δ-resistance
We have shown in Lemma 5.2, that the one-step transi-
tion probability P˘ss′(δ) increases as the destination utility
increases. Informally, the inverse destination utility at s′
represents a form of “resistance” to approaching state s′. In
this section, we will formalize this notion.
Definition 5.2 (δ-resistance): For a pure strategy state s ∈ S,
let us consider any graph g ∈ G(1){s}. For any δ > 0, the δ-
resistance associated with s ∈ S in graph g, is defined as
follows:
ϕδ(s|g) .=
∑
(sk→s`)∈g
1
uj(α(`))
. (12)
In other words, the δ-resistance of a state s along a graph
g corresponds to the sum of the inverse utilities of the
destination states along that graph, scaled by 1/. We further
denote by ϕ∗δ(s) the minimum δ-resistance, i.e., ϕ
∗
δ(s)
.
=
ming∈G(1){s} ϕδ(s|g) and by g∗(s) the {s}-graph that attains
this minimum resistance.
E. Stochastically stable states
The stochastically stable states can be identified as the states
of minimum resistance.
Theorem 5.1 (Stochastically stable states): As  ↓ 0, the set
of stochastically stable p.s.s.’s S∗ is such that, for any δ > 0
Φδ(S∗) .= max
s∗∈S∗
ϕ∗δ(s
∗) < min
s∈S\S∗
ϕ∗δ(s)
.
= Φδ(S\S∗). (13)
Proof. By Lemmas 5.2–5.3, for any state s ∈ S and for any
graph g ∈ G(1){s}, we have that, as  ↓ 0,
$˘(g; δ) = γ¯g
∏
(sk→s`)∈g
P˘sks`(δ) ≈ γ¯geη(δ)ϕδ(s|g),
and
R˘s(δ) =
∑
g∈G(1){s}
γ¯ge
η(δ)ϕδ(s|g).
Thus, for the states in S\S∗, and for sufficiently small  ↓ 0,
we have ∑
s∈S\S∗
R˘s(δ) = e
η(δ)Φδ(S\S∗)·∑
s∈S\S∗
∑
g∈G(1){s}
γ¯ge
η(δ)(ϕδ(s|g)−Φδ(S\S∗)).
Note that the second part of the r.h.s. approaches a finite value
as  ↓ 0, since ϕδ(s|g) ≥ Φδ(S\S∗) for each s ∈ S\S∗.
Analogously, for the states in S∗, we have∑
s∈S∗
R˘s(δ) = e
η(δ)Φδ(S∗)·∑
s∈S∗
∑
g∈G(1){s}
γ¯ge
η(δ)(ϕδ(s|g)−Φδ(S∗)).
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Thus, for sufficiently small ,∑
s∈S\S∗ R˘s(δ)∑
s∈S∗ R˘s(δ)
= eη(δ)(Φδ(S\S
∗)−Φδ(S∗))· ∑
s∈S\S∗
∑
g∈G(1){s} γ¯ge
η(δ)(ϕδ(s|g)−Φδ(S\S∗))∑
s∈S∗
∑
g∈G(1){s} γ¯geη(δ)(ϕδ(s|g)−Φδ(S
∗))
.
Given that Φδ(S\S∗)−Φδ(S∗) > 0, the first part of the r.h.s.
approaches 0 as  ↓ 0. Also, the numerator of the ratio of the
r.h.s. approaches a finite value, due to the definition of Φδ(S∗).
On the other hand, each term of the denominator approaches
either a finite value or ∞ as  ↓ 0. Thus,∑
s∈S\S∗ R˘s(δ)∑
s∈S∗ R˘s(δ)
↓0−−→ 0. (14)
Denote by piS∗ the probability assigned by the stationary
distribution pi to S∗. Then, according to (10), we have:
lim
↓0
piS∗
= lim
↓0
lim
δ↓0
∑
s∗∈S∗ R˘s∗(δ)∑
s∈S R˘s(δ)
= lim
δ↓0
lim
↓0
∑
s∗∈S∗ R˘s∗(δ)∑
s∈S R˘s(δ)
= lim
δ↓0
lim
↓0
1
1 +
∑
s∈S\S∗ R˘s(δ)/
∑
s∗∈S∗ R˘s∗(δ)
.
Note that the interchange of limits in the second equality
is valid due to the finiteness of the limits of the transition
probabilities (according to Lemma 5.3). Given (14), we
conclude that lim↓0 piS∗ = 1. Conversely, lim↓0 piS\S∗ = 0.
Thus, the stochastically stable states may only be contained
in S∗. 
In other words, Theorem 5.1 says that, in order for a p.s.s.
set S∗ to be stochastically stable, it suffices to show that for
any s ∈ S∗ there exists a {s}-graph with strictly smaller
δ-resistance from any other state s′ ∈ S\S∗. Note that this
theorem applies to any game that satisfies the positive-utility
property. In the following section, we illustrate the utility of
Theorem 5.1 in computing the stochastically stable states in
coordination games.
VI. ILLUSTRATION IN COORDINATION GAMES
A. Stochastic stability
In this section, we will be using the notion of best response
of a agent i into an action profile α = (αi, α−i), as well as
the notion of Nash equilibrium. In particular, we define:
Definition 6.1 (Best response): The best response of a player
i to an action profile α = (αi, α−i) is defined as the following
set of actions: BRi(α)
.
= arg maxa∈Ai ui(a, α−i).
Definition 6.2 (Nash equilibrium): An action profile α∗ =
(α∗i , α
∗
−i) is a Nash equilibrium, if for every player i, α
∗
i ∈
BRi(α
∗).
A best-response of a player i to an action profile will often
be denoted by α∗i . Note that, according to the above definition,
the best response of a player is never empty. We also introduce
the following notion of a coordination game.
Definition 6.3 (Coordination game): A strategic-form game
satisfying the positive-utility property (Property 2.1) is a
coordination game if, for every action profile α and player
i, uj(α′i, α−i) ≥ uj(αi, α−i) for any α′i ∈ BRi(α).
In other words, a coordination game is such that at any
action profile, if a player plays a best response, then no other
player gets worse-off. This is satisfied by default when the
current action profile is a Nash equilibrium, since a player’s
best response is to play the same action.
In order to address stochastic stability, we will further need
to introduce the notion of the best-BR (briefly, BBR).
Definition 6.4 (Best-BR): Let i∗ : A → I be defined as:
i∗(α) .= arg max
i∈I
{ui(αi, α−i) : αi ∈ BRi(α)} .
The one-step transition α = (αi∗ , α−i∗)→ (α∗i∗ , α−i∗), where
α∗i∗ ∈ BRi∗(α), is the best-BR to the current action profile α
and will briefly be denoted by BBR(α).
In other words, BBR(α) corresponds to the one-step tran-
sition, where the player which changes its action receives the
largest utility among all possible one-step transitions from α.
Lemma 6.1: Let SNE be the set of p.s.s.’s which correspond
to the set of pure Nash equilibria. In any coordination game,
the {SNE}-graph that attains the minimum δ-resistance is:
g∗(SNE) =
{
(sk → s`) : α(`) ∈ BBR(α)
}
.
Proof. Under the coordination property, and starting from any
state s /∈ SNE, we can construct a path starting from s and
leading to SNE that consists only of one-step best-BR’s. Such
a path will include no cycles (since the utility of all players
may not decrease along such path). Furthermore, such path of
best-BR’s may only terminate at a Nash equilibrium.
By Definition 5.1 of a {SNE}-graph, a state s /∈ SNE is
the source of exactly one arrow. Among the possible arrows
with source s, the one that corresponds to a best-BR is the
one with the minimum δ-resistance (since it provides the
maximum possible destination utility). We conclude that the
{SNE}-graph(s) consisting only of best-BR’s provide the
minimum δ-resistance. 
Lemma 6.1 shows that the {SNE}-graph of minimum δ-
resistance is the graph consisting of the one-step best-BR’s
starting from any non-Nash action profile. Using this property,
we can show that the set of Nash equilibria are the stochasti-
cally stable states in any coordination game.
Theorem 6.1 (Stochastic stability in coordination games): In
any coordination game of Definition 6.3, as  ↓ 0 and λ ↓ 0,
the stochastically stable pure strategy states satisfy S∗ ⊆ SNE.
Proof. It suffices to show that all p.s.s.’s outside SNE provide
a δ-resistance which is strictly higher than the δ-resistance of
any Nash equilibrium in SNE (as Theorem 5.1 dictates).
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Consider an action profile α which is not a Nash equilibrium
and the corresponding p.s.s. s. Consider the part of the optimal
{SNE}-graph which leads to s, i.e.,
g∗(s|SNE) .= {(sk → s`) ∈ g∗(SNE) : ∃ path from s` to s} .
In other words, g∗(s|SNE) corresponds to the part of the
minimum-resistance graph g∗(SNE) whose arrows lead to s.
This graph might be empty if s is not a recipient of any
arrow in g∗(SNE). For the remainder of the proof, define the
graphs: g1
.
= g∗(SNE)\g∗(s|SNE), g2 .= g∗(s)\g∗(s|SNE).
Note that, g∗(s|SNE) ⊂ g∗(s), i.e., the graph that leads to s
through the minimum resistance graph of SNE is also part of
the minimum resistance graph of s. By construction, we also
have g∗(s|SNE) ⊂ g∗(SNE). Thus, the exact same arrows (i.e.,
the ones in g∗(s|SNE)) are subtracted from g∗(SNE) and g∗(s)
to define the graphs g1 and g2, respectively.
By definition of the {SNE}-graphs, a node within the set
{SNE} cannot be the source of any arrow in g1. Similarly, node
s may not be the source of any arrow in g2. Since |SNE| ≥ 1,
and the fact that only a single arrow may stem from any given
node, we conclude that |g1| ≤ |g2|, i.e., g2 contains at least as
many arrows as g1.
Furthermore, by construction of graphs g1 and g2, there
exists at least one node s′ /∈ SNE with the following property:
(s′ → s′′) ∈ g1 such that α′′ ∈ BBR(α′), and (s′ → s′′′) ∈ g2
such that α′′′ /∈ BBR(α′). This is due to the fact that any path
in g2 should eventually lead to s /∈ SNE.
Thus, we conclude that g2 contains at least as many arrows
as g1, and g2 contains arrows which are not best-BR steps.
Since only best-BR transition steps achieve the minimum
resistance, we conclude that ϕ(s|g2) > ϕ(s|g1), which
implies that any {s}-graph may only have larger δ-resistance
as compared to the minimum δ-resistance of g∗(SNE). 
B. Simulation study in distributed network formation
In this section, we perform a simulation study of the
proposed learning dynamics in a class of network formation
games [33]. We consider n nodes deployed on the plane and
assume that the set of actions of each node or agent i, Ai,
contains all possible combinations of neighbors of i, denoted
Ni, with which a link can be established, i.e., Ai = 2Ni ,
including the empty set. Links are considered unidirectional,
and a link established by node i with node j, denoted (j, i),
starts at j with the arrowhead pointing to i. A graph G is
defined as a collection of nodes and directed links. Define
also a path from j to i as a sequence of nodes and directed
links that starts at j and ends to i following the orientation of
the graph, i.e.,
(j → i) = {j = j0, (j0, j1), j1, . . . , (jm−1, jm), jm = i}
for some positive integer m. In a connected graph, there is a
path from any node to any other node.
1
2 3
1
2 3
Fig. 2. Nash networks in case of n = 3 agents and 0 < ν < 1.
Let us consider a utility function ui : A → R, such that
ui(α)
.
=
∑
j∈I\{i}
χα(j → i)− κ |αi| , (15)
i ∈ I, where |αi| denotes the number of links corresponding
to αi and κ is a constant in (0, 1). Also,
χα(j → i) .=
{
1 if (j → i) ⊆ Gα ,
0 otherwise,
where Gα denotes the graph induced by joint action α. As it
was shown in Proposition 4.2 in [33], a network G∗ is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if it is critically connected, i.e., i) it is
connected, and ii) for any (s, i) ∈ G, (s → i) is the unique
path from s to i. For example, the Nash equilibria for n = 3
agents and unconstrained neighborhoods are shown in Fig. 2.
Proposition 6.1: The network formation game defined by
(15) is a coordination game.
Proof. First, note that any network formation game with the
utility of (15) satisfies the positive-utility property. This is
due to the fact that for any single link of cost κ ∈ (0, 1),
an agent receives utility of at least 1. For any joint action
α /∈ A∗ assume that a node i picks its best response. Then
no other agent becomes worse off, since a best response of
any node i always retains connectivity. Note that this is not
necessarily true for any other change in actions. Thus, the
coordination property of Definition 6.3 is satisfied. 
Fig. 3 depicts the response of the learning dynamics in the
network formation game. We consider 6 nodes deployed on
the plane, where the neighbors of each node are defined as
the two immediate nodes (e.g., the neighbors of node 1 are
N1 = {2, 6}). According to Theorem 6.1, in order for the
average behavior to be observed, λ and  need to be sufficiently
small. We choose:  = λ = 0.005, and κ = 1/2.
Given the large number of actions, we do not plot the
strategy vector for each node. Instead, we plot the inverse total
distance from each node to its neighboring nodes. In a wheel
structure (and only under this structure), the inverse total dis-
tance to the neighboring nodes is equal to 1/1+5 = 1/6 ≈ 0.167.
The wheel structure is among the Nash equilibria of this game
(as shown in [33]) and the unique payoff-dominant equilibrium
(i.e., every node receives its maximum utility). The wheel
structure is the emergent structure as shown in Fig. 3.
The simulation of Fig. 3 verifies Theorem 6.1, since conver-
gence (in a weak sense) is attained to the set of Nash equilibria.
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Final Graph
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0
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Running average of inverse total distance
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(b)
Fig. 3. (a) Final graph and (b) running-average inverse total distance with time under the perturbed learning automata dynamics of Table I when applied to
the network formation game.
However, it also demonstrates the potential of this class of
dynamics for stronger convergence results, since the emergent
Nash equilibrium is also payoff-dominant.
VII. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered a class of reinforcement-based
learning dynamics that belongs to the family of discrete-time
replicator dynamics and learning automata, and we provided
an explicit characterization of the invariant probability measure
of the induced Markov chain. Through this analysis, we
demonstrated convergence (in a weak sense) to the set of
pure strategy states, overcoming prior limitations of the ODE-
method for stochastic approximations, such as the existence
of a potential function. Furthermore, we provided a simplified
methodology for computing the set of stochastically stable
states, and we demonstrated its utility in the context of
coordination games. This is the first result in this class of dy-
namics that demonstrates global convergence properties with
no restrictions in the number of players and without requiring
the existence of a potential function. Thus, it opens up new
possibilities for the use of reinforcement-based learning in
distributed control of multi-agent systems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1
Let us first consider the perturbed process Pλ. Let us also
consider any sequence {z(k) = (α(k), x(k))} such that z(k) →
z = (α, x) ∈ Z . For any open set O ∈ B(Z),
Pλ(z
(k) = (α(k), x(k)), O)
=
∑
α∈PA(O)
{ n∏
i=1
x˜
(k)
iαi
·
n∏
i=1
Pz(k) [Ri(α, x(k)i ) ∈ PXi(O)]
}
=
∑
α∈PA(O)
{ n∏
i=1
IPXi (O)(Ri(α, x
(k)
i ))x˜
(k)
iαi
}
,
where PXi(O) and PA(O) are the canonical projections de-
fined by the product topology, and x˜(k)iαi
.
= (1−λ)x(k)iαi+λ/|Ai|.
Similarly, we have:
Pλ(z,O) =
∑
α∈PA(O)
{ n∏
i=1
IPXi (O) (Ri (α, xi)) x˜iαi
}
.
To investigate the limit of Pλ(z(k), O) as k → ∞, it
suffices to investigate the behavior of the sequence ζ(k)i
.
=
IPXi (O)(Ri(α, x
(k)
i )). We distinguish the following (comple-
mentary) cases:
(a) Ri(α, xi) /∈ PXi(O) and Ri(α, xi) /∈ ∂PXi(O): In this
case, there exists an open ball about the next strategy vector
that does not share any common points with PXi(O). Due to
the continuity of the function Ri(α, ·), we have that ζ(k)i →
ζi
.
= IPXi (O)(Ri(α, xi)) ≡ 0.
(b) Ri(α, xi) ∈ PXi(O): In this case, there exists an open
ball about the next strategy vector that belongs to PXi(O),
since O ∈ B(Z). Due to the continuity of the function
Ri(α, ·), we have that ζ(k)i → ζi = 1.
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(c) Ri(α, xi) /∈ PXi(O) and Ri(α, xi) ∈ ∂PXi(O): In this
case, ζi ≡ 0. We conclude that lim infk→∞ ζ(k)i ≥ ζi = 0,
since ζ(k)i ∈ {0, 1}.
In either one of the above (complementary) cases, we
have that lim infk→∞ ζ
(k)
i ≥ ζi. Finally, due to the con-
tinuity of the perturbed strategy vector x˜iαi with respect
to xiαi , we conclude that for any sequence z
(k) → z,
lim infk→∞ Pλ(z(k), O) ≥ Pλ(z,O). Thus, by [30, Propo-
sition 7.2.1], Pλ satisfies the weak Feller property.
The above derivation can be generalized to any selection
probability function f(xiαi) in the place of x˜iαi , provided that
it is a continuous function. Thus, the proof for the unperturbed
process P follows the exact same reasoning by simply setting
f(xiαi) = xiαi .
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.1
(a) Let us consider an action profile α = (α1, ..., αn) ∈
A, and an initial strategy profile x(0) = (x1(0), ..., xn(0))
such that xiαi(0) > 0 for all i ∈ I. Note that if the same
action profile α is selected consecutively up to time t, then
the strategy of agent i satisfies:
xi(t) = eαi − (1− ui(α))t(eαi − xi(0)). (16)
Given that Bt is non-increasing, from continuity from above
we have
Pz[B∞] = lim
t→∞Pz[Bt] = limt→∞
t∏
k=0
n∏
i=1
xiαi(k). (17)
Note that Pz[B∞] > 0 if and only if
∞∑
t=0
log(xiαi(t)) > −∞, for all i ∈ I. (18)
Let us introduce the variable yi(t)
.
= 1 − xiαi(t), which
corresponds to the probability of agent i selecting any action
other than αi. Condition (18) is equivalent to
−
∞∑
t=0
log(1− yi(t)) <∞, for all i ∈ I. (19)
Note that yi(t+1)/yi(t) = 1−ui(α) < 1, which (by the Ratio
test, cf., [34, Theorem 6.2.4]) implies that the series of positive
terms
∑∞
t=1 yi(t) is convergent. Hence, limt→∞ yi(t) = 0.
Thus, from L’Hospital’s rule (cf., [35, Theorem 5.13]),
lim
t→∞
− log(1− yi(t))
yi(t)
= lim
t→∞
1
1− yi(t) = 1 > 0. (20)
From the Limit Comparison Test (cf., [34, Theorem 6.2.2]), we
conclude that condition (19) holds, which equivalently implies
that Pz[B∞] > 0. Lastly, due to (16), Pz[B∞] is continuous
with respect to x(0) which takes values in a bounded and
closed set X . Thus, by [34, Theorem 3.2.2], we conclude that
infz∈Z Pz[B∞] > 0.
(b) Define the set C`
.
=
{
z ∈ Z : |xi|∞ > 1− ` ,∀i ∈ I
}
,
where |xi|∞ .= max{xiαi , αi ∈ Ai}, i.e., C` corresponds to a
strategy being close to a vertex of X . For ` > 0,
Pz[At] ≥
t∑
k=1
Pz[τ(C`) = k , Z ◦ θk ∈ B∞]
=
t∑
k=1
Pz[Z ◦ θk ∈ B∞|τ(C`) = k] · Pz[τ(C`) = k]
≥ inf
z∈C`
Pz[B∞] ·
t∑
k=1
Pz[τ(C`) = k]
≥ inf
z∈C`
Pz[B∞] · inf
z∈Cc`
Pz[τ(C`) ≤ t], (21)
where the second inequality is due to the Markov property.
Consider the subsequence tk = k`m, for some m = m(`) > 0
such that, the time block of `m iterations is sufficiently large
so that C` can be reachable from any state in Cc` . Then,
Pz[τ(C`) ≤ tk|τ(C`) > tk−1] ≥ inf
z∈Cc`
Pz[B`m ] ≥ inf
z∈Cc`
Pz[B∞],
where the last inequality is due to (17). Given (a), and for
any ` > 0, the r.h.s. of the above inequality is bounded away
from zero. Hence, from the counterpart of the Borel-Cantelli
Lemma (cf., [36, Section 3.3]) and the fact that {τ(C`) ≤
tk} ⊆ {τ(C`) ≤ tk+1}, we have that, for any ` > 0,
lim
k→∞
inf
z∈Cc`
Pz[τ(C`) ≤ tk] = 1. (22)
Finally, set k = `. Then, tk = t` = `m+1. Given (21)–(22)
and from continuity from below, we have
Pz[A∞] = lim
`→∞
P[At` ] ≥ lim
`→∞
inf
z∈C`
Pz[B∞] = 1,
where the last equality is due to the definition of C` and (17).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5.3
(a) The state z′, realized after agent j trembled and played
α′j starting from s, is uniquely defined as z
′ .= (α′, eαj +
uj(α
′)(eα′j − eαj )). Thus, we can write:
QP t(s,Nδ(s′))
=
∫
Z
γjδz′(dy)P
t(y,Nδ(s′)) = γjP t(z′,Nδ(s′)).
Given that Nδ(s′) is a continuity set of QΠ(s, ·), from
Portmanteau theorem we have that, for any δ > 0,
Pˆss′ = QΠ(s,Nδ(s′)) = γj lim
t→∞P
t(z′,Nδ(s′)).
Note also that P t(z′,Nδ(s′)) ≤ Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ t]. Since the
sequence of events {τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ t}t is non-decreasing, then
from continuity from below, we have that, for any δ > 0,
lim
t→∞P
t(z′,Nδ(s′)) ≤ Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ ∞]. (23)
On the other hand, we have
P t(z′,Nδ(s′)) ≥
t∑
k=1
Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) = k, Z ◦ θk ∈ B∞]
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≥ inf
z∈Nδ(s′)
Pz[B∞] · Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ t],
where in the second inequality we have used the Markov
property. Given that limδ↓0 infz∈Nδ(s′) Pz[B∞] = 1, we get
lim
δ↓0
lim
t→∞P
t(z′,Nδ(s′)) ≥ lim
δ↓0
Pz′ [τ(Nδ(s′)) ≤ ∞]. (24)
The conclusion follows directly from (23)–(24).
(b) Consider the unperturbed process initiated at state z′,
i.e., Z0 = z′. Let us also define the set
Dj,`(α
′) .=
{
(α, x) ∈ Z : xjα′j > 1−Hj(α′)`
}
,
where Hj(α′)
.
= 1−uj(α′). The set Dj,`(α′) is the unreach-
able set in the strategy space of agent j when starting from
xjα′j = 0 and playing action α
′
j for ` consecutive steps. Define
also the set
Ej,`(α
′) .= Dj,`+1(α′)c ∩Dj,`(α′).
One possibility for realizing a transition from z′ to Nδ(s′)
is to follow the shortest path, that is, the path of playing action
α′ consecutively. Thus,
P˘ss′(δ) ≥ Pz′ [α(t+ 1) = α′,∀t < τ∗s(Nδ(s′))] . (25)
When the process reaches Nδ(s′) for the first time, action
profile α′ has been played for at least τ∗s(Nδ(s′)) times.2
Define an iteration subsequence {tk}, with Zt0 = Z0 = z′,
such that, at any time tk action α′ is selected for the next
iteration (i.e., α(t0 + 1) = ... = α(tk + 1) = α′). Due to the
Markov property, in order for the unperturbed process to reach
Nδ(s′), there exists time tk such that α(tk + 1) = α′ while
Ztk ∈ Ej,k(α′). Thus,
P˘ss′(δ) ≤ Pz′ [∃{tk} : α(tk + 1) = α′, Ztk ∈ Ej,k(α′),
for all k < τ∗s(Nδ(s′))] .
Using the properties of the conditional probability, we also
have:
P˘ss′(δ) ≤ Pz′ [∃{tk} : α(tk + 1) = α′ ,∀k < τ∗s(Nδ(s′))|
2Let us assume that along a sample path from z′ to Nδ(s′) and at iteration
tk , the strategy of agent j with respect to action α′j is xjα′j (tk) = ρ > 0.
If agent j selects action α′j at time tk + 1, it’s next strategy will be:
xjα′j
(tk + 1) = ρ+ uj(α
′)(1− ρ) = uj(α′) +Hj(α′)ρ .= x∗jα′j .
If, instead, agent j selects action αj 6= α′j at time tk+1 and then α′j at time
tk + 2, i.e., it deviates from playing action α′j , then the strategy evolves as:
xjα′j
(tk + 1) = ρ+ uj(α)(−ρ)
= Hj(α)ρ,
xjα′j
(tk + 2) = Hj(α)ρ+ uj(α
′)(1−Hj(α)ρ)
= (Hj(α
′)ρ)Hj(α) + uj(α′)
< x∗jα′j
,
since 0 < uj(α) < 1. Informally, any single deviation from the shortest
path to s′ cannot recover the drop in the strategy at the next iteration. Thus,
along any path from z′ to Nδ(s′), when the process reaches Nδ(s′) for the
first time, action α′ has been played for at least τ∗s(Nδ(s′)) times, which is
the number of iterations required for reaching Nδ(s′) along the shortest path.
Ztk ∈ Ej,k(α′)] .
Using again the Markov property,
P˘ss′(δ)
≤
∏
t<τ∗s(Nδ(s′))
sup
z∈Ej,t(α′)
Pz′ [α(t+ 1) = α′|Zt = z]
= Pz′ [α(t+ 1) = α′, t < τ∗s(Nδ(s′))] .
Given also (25), the conclusion follows.
(c) The minimum first hitting time to the setNδ(s′) satisfies:
τ∗s(Nδ(s′)) =
⌈
log(δ)
log(Hj(α′))
⌉
.
= T (),
where Hj(α′)
.
= 1 − uj(α′). There exists correction factor
c = c(, δ) ∈ [0, 1), such that
T () =
log(δ)
log(Hj(α′))
+ c(, δ).
Due to statement (b), and for sufficiently small  > 0, we
have:
log
(
P˘ss′(δ)
)
≈
T ()∑
t=1
log
(
1−Hj(α′)t
)
. (26)
In the remainder of the proof, we will approximate the r.h.s.
of (26).
To simplify notation, denote H .= Hj(α′). Note that
lim
↓0
log
(
HT ()
)
= lim
↓0
{(
log(δ)
log(H)
+ c(, δ)
)
log(H)
}
= log(δ),
and due to the continuity of the natural logarithm,
lim
↓0
HT () = δ. (27)
As a result, for any ` ∈ N,
lim
↓0
H`T () = δ`.
By Taylor series expansion of the natural logarithm (for small
argument values), we have:
log
(
1−Ht) ≈ − ∞∑
`=1
H`t
`
.
Thus,
(1−H)
T ()∑
t=1
log
(
1−Ht)
≈ −
∞∑
`=1
1
`
[
(1−H)
T ()∑
t=1
H`t
]
= −
∞∑
`=1
1
`
[
(1−H)1−H
`(T ()+1)
1−H` − (1−H)
]
= −
∞∑
`=1
1
`
[ 1−H`(T ()+1)
1 +H + · · ·+H`−1 − (1−H)
]
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Note that, for any ` ∈ N, H` → 1 as  ↓ 0. Thus, we have
lim
↓0
(1−H)
T ()∑
t=1
log
(
1−Ht)
≈ −
∞∑
`=1
1
`2
(1− δ`) .= η(δ),
which corresponds to a negative finite constant. Hence, using
the fact that 1−H = uj(α′), we conclude that, for sufficiently
small  > 0,
log(P˘ss′(δ)) ≈ η(δ)
uj(α′)
.
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